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ABSTRACT 
As indicated by the 9/11 Commission, the private sector accounts for 
approximately 85% of the critical infrastructure in the United States and accounts 
for approximately 80% of the gross domestic product. The private sector clearly 
is the engine that drives U.S. economic vitality, and as such, it is critical that it 
maintains business continuity in the face of a disaster. Moreover, it is equally 
important to the private sector that communities affected by a disaster recover as 
quickly as possible to enable it to conduct normal day-to-day business once 
again, which drives the bottom-line for most companies. The impact of disasters 
on economic vitality is readily available in numerous studies. It was estimated 
that the worldwide economic losses incurred during 2004 due to natural disasters 
was over $145 billion, or more than twice as much as in 2003. Moreover, 
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina have highlighted the inadequacies of the 
national response system when faced with catastrophic disasters and the further 
inability to incorporate willing participation and resources properly from the 
private sector. 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how response and relief 
operations at the federal, state and local level can be further improved by 
providing a better implementation of a network-based methodology for the private 
sector to participate in the national response framework.  
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The nation’s disaster response system is a multi-scaled and overlapping 
network of public, private, tribal, and non-governmental organizations that 
contribute in one form or another to responding to incidents. The National 
Response Framework (NRF) is the guiding document that establishes national 
level policy and procedures and outlines how all layers of this system are 
supposed to work together. The NRF guides agencies on conducting all-hazards 
responses based on scalable, flexible, and adaptable structures. The intention of 
the document is to provide the foundation for authorities, best practices, and the 
organizational structures to support responses to terrorist attacks and natural 
disasters (Department of Homeland Security, 2008a, p. 2).  
With regards to the private sector specifically, the NRF discusses the need 
to have a close partnership between the government and the private sector to 
identify and eliminate the vulnerabilities of the private sector (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2003, p. 12). In addition, an entire division exists within the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) dedicated specifically to critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP). The NRF also discusses the need to have private 
sector elements respond to incidents at their own facilities and to be able to link 
up with local government incident managers to develop response plans (NRF, 
2010, p. 32). Moreover, a great deal of work, research has been done, and 
organizational effort to incorporate volunteer agencies, such as the Red Cross, 
into disaster relief (Simo & Bies, 2007, pp. 67, 125–142). 
Some good examples of the value and benefit “for-profit” companies have 
provided during disaster relief scenarios can be cited. For instance, Wal-Mart is 
able to predict the types of goods they should have in their stores in areas prone 
to hurricanes. In addition, Wal-Mart also reassigns personnel throughout the  
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country to backfill employees in impacted areas, indicative of both their continuity 
of operations priorities, as well as their capacity to support large-scale disasters 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006c, p. 5). 
As indicated by a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the 
relief efforts during Hurricane Katrina, while thousands of lives were saved, many 
federal, state, local government, and private sector organizations were unable to 
meet the overwhelming demands imposed by the catastrophic impacts of the 
hurricane (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006a, pp. 6–10). Crisis 
management and large-scale disaster relief demand that all available assets be 
engaged to meet the demands of the relief effort. The disaster preparedness 
community needs better policy and partnerships to enable the private sector to 
have a larger role in relief efforts from the earliest stages of the preparedness 
cycle.  
Hurricane Katrina, and more recently, the relief efforts in Haiti, clearly 
demonstrated the significant role the private sector could play in providing 
logistical expertise and critical resources to responders, as well as assisting with 
providing care for relief victims. However, the current policies in place do not 
offer a formal and repeatable process for the role the private sector can play in 
disaster response preparation and operations. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the private sector, specifically “for-profit” organizations, be better 
leveraged and serve a more integrated role in the disaster preparedness process 
at the federal, state, and local levels?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Disaster preparedness transverses all aspects of U.S. society, from the 
individual to the broadest expanses of the U.S. federal government. Throughout 
this spectrum, a great deal of literature outlines the roles and responsibilities of 
the various players in the disaster preparedness world of work. This review 
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focuses on existing governmental policy and doctrine specifically centered on the 
role of the private sector in disaster preparedness. In addition, it examines the 
private sector’s role in business continuity and how that fits in the disaster 
preparedness cycle. 
1. Governmental Policy and Doctrine 
The role and importance the private sector plays in U.S. national 
readiness posture, either as the engine for this nation’s economic vitality, or 
within homeland security or national defense, is not a new concept and is well 
supported by literature. In fact, at least dating back to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
private industry has been viewed as having a critical role in U.S. national 
security. The problems encountered within the telecommunications sector that 
hampered the direct negotiations between President Kennedy and Premier 
Khrushchev resulted in the creation of the National Communications System 
(NCS) in 1963 (Lewis, 2006, p. 30). The NCS was created to “provide necessary 
communications for the Federal Government under all conditions” (Department of 
Homeland Security, n.d.). 
Private industry’s role in the evolution of homeland security has mostly 
grown out the Cuban Missile Crisis experience, especially as it applies to 
maintaining critical infrastructure. President Reagan issued Executive Order 
12656, which began to qualify further the federal government’s role in identifying 
private facilities and resources essential to national defense and the vitality of the 
economy (The White House, 1988). Further, this order also directed interagency 
activities to integrate preparedness and response strategies, as well as the ability 
to assess the effects of disruptions due to disaster or attack. It is clear from this 
action that President Reagan and the rest of government was not only 
acknowledging the importance of the private sector with regard to its ability to 
provide resources to an incident but also the need for business activity to resume 
in the wake of a disaster to minimize the impact on the economic vitality of the 
nation.  
 4 
This view was further explored and formalized under President Clinton 
after he issued Executive Order EO-13010 in 1996. This order established the 
Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which generated 
the first definition of critical infrastructure. The Executive Order states, “Certain 
national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have 
a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States. 
These critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power 
systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, 
transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, 
police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government” (The White House, 1996). 
The post-9/11 governmental policy continues to build upon this framework and 
has further linked the federal government and private industry under the umbrella 
of homeland security.  
The 9/11 Commission Report clearly established the link between the 
private sector and national preparedness and provided a series of measures to 
improve the preparedness posture of the private sector. The report states, “The 
private sector controls 85% of the critical infrastructure in the nation…Homeland 
security and national preparedness therefore begins with the private sector” (The 
9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 398). The Commission Report further, and 
quite eloquently, articulates the rationale for the private sector to be involved in 
the preparedness cycle: “Private sector preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost 
of doing business in the post-9/11 world. It is ignored at a tremendous potential 
cost in lives, money, and national security” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, 
p. 398). The National Strategies for Homeland Security and the National 
Response Framework (NRF), from this aforementioned framework, have further 
devised strategies to define the policies for implementing the private sector’s role 
in homeland security.  
The NRF is the comprehensive document that addresses roles, 
responsibilities, activities, and interdependencies for partners involved in 
response and short-term recovery actions to disasters and emergencies 
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(Department of Homeland Security, 2010b, p. 1). The NRF places significant 
emphasis on the need for engaged partnerships, as well as the need for an unity 
of effort through unified command as it specifically relates to the private sector 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008a, pp. 9–10, 48). In addition, the Private 
Sector Coordination Support Annex (PSCSA) provides the most comprehensive 
discussion of the role that the private sector can fulfill in national preparedness. 
However, it falls short in terms of defining the exact role of the private sector 
when it comes to interacting with the response community. For instance, the 
private sector is encouraged to participate in sector coordinating councils, “as the 
principal entity for coordinating with the government on a wide range of critical 
infrastructure protection activities and issues” (Department of Homeland Security, 
2008b, p. PRV-5). It further describes the councils as “self-organized and self-
regulated;” however, it does not detail where and when the councils should 
engage the preparedness system. Moreover, the available policy documents, 
most notably the PSCSA, simply indicate that the private sector for-profit 
organizations should assign liaisons at the joint field office level or work with the 
state, local, and tribal authorities to integrate in the preparedness process 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2008b, p. PRV-7).  
The lack of firm policy in the arena of outlining the private sector role in the 
preparedness process seems to be an area of weaknesses that if improved, 
could help better leverage the capabilities and capacities of the private sector. 
2. Private Sector 
As emphasized by the 9/11 Commission, the private sector accounts for 
approximately 85% of the critical infrastructure in the United States and accounts 
for approximately 80% of the gross domestic product (Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2007, p. 9). The private sector clearly is the 
engine that drives U.S. economic vitality, and as such, it is critical that it 
maintains business continuity in the face of a disaster. Moreover, it is equally 
important to the private sector that communities affected by a disaster recover as 
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quickly as possible to enable them to normal day-to-day business once again 
conduct, which drives the bottom-line for most companies. A great deal of 
literature is available that examines the impact of disasters on the overall 
economy, business continuity, and the role the private sector in disaster 
preparedness. 
The impact of disasters on economic vitality is readily available in 
numerous studies. It was estimated that the worldwide economic losses incurred 
during 2004 due to natural disasters was over $145 billion or over twice as much 
as in 2003 (Hochrainer, 2007, p. 31). Moreover, as depicted in Figure 1, a 
number of studies suggest natural disasters are increasing in quantity and are 
having an increasing impact on the worldwide economies due to a number of 
factors including the location of the disaster, large population growth, low use of 
mitigation and preventative measures, and limited available resources to respond 
to events among others (Miller & Keipi, 2005, p. 3). 
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Figure 1.  Increase in Number and Damage from Natural Disasters (From Whybark, 
Melnyk, Day, & Davis, 2010) 
The available literature suggests the private sector consists of a significant 
part of the overall economic welfare of most nations, and in particular, the United 
States. Further, the literature indicates it is incumbent upon the private sector to 
have a robust resiliency and well-defined continuity of operations plans to get up 
and running quickly in the wake of disasters. In the book, Business Continuity 
Management: A Crisis Management Approach, Dominic Elliott et al. (2002) 
outline the social and technical impacts of business interruptions and the need to 
build resiliency throughout the business operations (p. 2). 
As noted in The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned, “More often than not, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
successfully contributed to the relief effort in spite of government obstacles and 
with almost no government support or direction. Time and again, government  
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agencies did not effectively coordinate relief operations with NGOs. Often, 
government agencies failed to match relief needs with NGO and private sector 
capabilities” (Townsend, 2006, p. 64). 
3. Future Role of the Private Sector in Disaster Preparedness 
The literature thus far suggests disasters are causing increasingly larger 
economic and social impacts throughout the globe, the federal government 
recognizes the importance of the private sector in disaster preparedness, and the 
private sector already is playing a role in disaster relief, albeit mostly self-
generated. However, the literature to support a more clearly defined role of the 
private sector in the entire disaster preparedness cycle does not seem to exist. In 
fact, conversely, literature is readily available supporting the lack of coordination 
between all levels of government and the private sector. Retired Coast Guard 
Commander Stephen Flynn and Daniel Prieto (2006) directly support this point 
by suggesting that, “the capabilities, assets, and goodwill of the private sector to 
bolster our homeland security remain largely untapped” (p. 1). Similarly, Nathan 
Busch and Austen Givens authored an article that explored both the 
opportunities and challenges in public-private partnerships in homeland security. 
More specifically, the article highlights examples of successes where the private 
sector has significantly contributed to the ability of the federal government, as 
well as state and local governments, in responding to a disaster, with the most 
recent example of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Busch & Givens, 2012, p. 1). 
In addition, the authors also stress some of the obstacles preventing even further 
cooperation including access to information, sharing proprietary information 
among competitors, and organizational liabilities for companies that share 
information with government regulators (Busch & Givens, 2012, p. 10). 
Busch and Givens’ exploration of some of the resistance felt by both the 
public and private sectors in what has traditionally been public sector territory can 
be further investigated by reviewing literature that focuses on the academic 
perspective of capital markets, as well as discussions on the benefits of 
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combining public, private and non-profit communities, such as the concept of 
Megacommunities. For instance, Michael Porter developed a model for 
companies to use when evaluating their position within their portion of the overall 
economy. If the discussion of Porter’s model is framed through the disaster 
response lens, it is possible to notice several areas in which businesses need to 
not only be aware of but perhaps heavily involved in working through the disaster 
response from a business continuity, as well as customer resiliency perspective. 
For instance, in the wake of a large natural disaster, a business will have to be 
attentive to disruptions in its supply chain and whether or not that leaves it 
vulnerable to having its customers move to other competitors (Porter, 2008, p. 
34). Moreover, much of what Porter has discussed in many aspects of his works 
centers on companies gaining a strategic competitive advantage. If customers 
see a company like Home Depot assisting them when they are most in need, but 
does not see a similar response from Lowe’s, that customer may be inclined to 
give their future business to Home Depot over Lowe’s, and thus, create a 
competitive strategic advantage (Porter, 2008, p. 34). 
The book by Mark Gerencser et al., Megacommunities: How Leaders of 
Government, Business and Non-Profits Can Tackle Today’s Global Challenges 
Together further explores combining the resources of the public and private 
sector. The book describes the need for the public and private sector to form a 
collaborative partnership to combat the wicked problems facing the United States 
today. Walter Isaacson, President and CEO of the Aspen Institute, describes the 
concept in the foreword of the book as follows. 
These new complexities are a natural consequence of a world 
made smaller by greater integration and interdependency. Issues 
that arise in this environment can abruptly and unpredictably 
escalate, with a scale and magnitude that can quickly overwhelm 
the effected institutions. As a result leaders from all the sectors face 
a growing need to operate in a more open, distributed, and 
collaborative manner that recognizes the shared nature of risks, 
rewards, and responsibility. Unfortunately this type of activity is not 
intuitive for most leaders. (Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 
2008, Foreword) 
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As outlined previously, ample policy documents and research to support 
the concept of incorporating the theories set out in the Megacommunity concept 
are available; however, the practice of establishing a true collaborative and 
integrated network between the public and private sector has yet to be realized. 
Further examining this concept using a network approach also further supports 
the position of increasing the private sector role in disaster preparedness. 
As described in the literature regarding Hurricane Katrina and many other 
larger scale disasters, the events are often described as overwhelming to the 
disaster response system. Review of literature on network theory indicates 
increasing nodes or entities within a network can consequently improve the 
resiliency of and the redundancy within the network (Barabasi, 2003, p. 24). In 
reviewing the disaster preparedness system as a network, literature exists that 
would support incorporating the private sector as a separate “small-world” 
network to help further strengthen the ability of the larger response network to 
withstand the overwhelming demand vectors that occur during large-scale 
disasters (Lewis, 2011, p. 12). 
While broad literature supporting private sector involvement is not 
necessarily readily available, literature to demonstrate successful components 
within the homeland security arena that fuse components of the public and 
private sectors that improve overall U.S. security capability is. The Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA), which was the defining legislation for the 
Coast Guard after 9/11, created the requirement for Coast Guard Captains of the 
Port to establish maritime security committees. These committees were intended 
to assist the Coast Guard in developing a comprehensive maritime security plan 
for the port community to include both public and private entities (Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, (a) (2)). The maritime security 
committees have received high praise across all spectrums from the membership 
of the committees as noted by a GAO report, “Area maritime security committees 
have provided a structure to improve the timeliness, completeness, and 
usefulness of information sharing between federal and nonfederal stakeholders. 
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Stakeholders stated that among other things, the committees have been used as 
a forum for sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing information on 
illegal or suspicious activities and providing input on portwide security plans—
called area maritime security plans—that describe the joint strategies of the 
Coast Guard and its partner agencies for protecting key infrastructure against 
terrorist activities” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005). 
Overall, an ample supply of literature is available to support the research. 
From the policy perspective, the literature clearly indicates the need to 
incorporate the private industry; however, literature that articulated the policy for 
the “how-to” on using the private sector throughout the preparedness cycle was 
not available. The literature on business continuity and the role of the private 
sector in disaster response is again abundant and further indicates the need to 
better define its role in the preparedness cycle. Based on reporting from the 
GAO, as well as from the information provided by the private sector members of 
the maritime security committees, the literature suggests these committees could 
be the foundation for expanding the role of the private sector in the U.S.’ formal 
disaster preparedness cycle. 
D. HYPOTHESIS  
Response and relief operations at the federal, state, and local level can be 
further improved by providing a better-articulated plan for incorporating the 
private sector, which can provide the response community with access to 
numerous resources that have historically proved invaluable to response and 
relief operations. For instance, national-level corporations can provide access to 
robust logistics infrastructures, as well as large inventories of supplies from other 
parts of the nation not impacted by a disaster. Moreover, whether a national-level 
or regional business, most companies will have a sound understanding of the 




The methodology used to research this topic consists of a combination of 
policy analysis and case study review. The underlying issue, as discussed in the 
problem statement, is existing federal, state, and local policy is not available to 
account adequately for the ability of the private sector to participate in the 
disaster preparedness process. The case study is used to both highlight 
capabilities of the private sector, as well as emphasize the short falls of existing 
policy. 
1. Policy Analysis 
Many of the over-arching policy documents present the case of expanding 
partnerships at all levels of government, federal, local, state, and tribal. In 
addition, these same policy documents also articulate the need to establish and 
maintain partnerships between the public and private sector (National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, 2003, p. 12). The role of the private sector is further 
defined under the NRF, and more specifically, the PSCSA, where the relationship 
is intended to provide effective and efficient use of private-sector and federal 
resources, enable timely exchange of information, and maintain public and 
market confidence in times of crisis or catastrophe (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008b, p. PRV-2). These policies have come under significant scrutiny 
and criticism after major disasters, and require further analysis and 
recommended changes. 
2. Case Study 
In conjunction with the policy analysis, a case study is used to highlight 
the positive contributions that the private sector made during disaster 
relief/recovery efforts in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Professor Stephen 
Horowitz (2008) makes the case that for-profit private sector companies operate 
in the free market economy, which inherently demands they have a focused 
market discipline, while at the same time, exhibit agility to respond to ever-
changing market conditions (p. 2). In his lessons learned report, Professor 
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Horowitz details universally unanimous agreement by local officials that Wal-
Mart’s response was critical in helping prevent events from getting even worse.  
The case study of Hurricane Katrina is used to provide the foundations to 
the conclusions and recommendations. The case study is intended to 
demonstrate the gaps in existing policy that inhibit the private sector from 
becoming more involved in the preparedness cycle. In addition, the case study 
highlights the capacities and capabilities that private industry has contributed to 
responses and uses those examples as the drivers for amending existing policy 
to incorporate these capabilities. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Existing literature suggests the private sector is not only willing, but also 
quite capable of making significant contributions to disaster response and relief 
operations. Additionally, the literature also suggests that all levels of government, 
federal, state, and local, recognize the importance of establishing partnerships 
with the private sector; however, all too often, it seems that the role of the private 
sector occurs on an ad hoc basis. This research contributes to the national 
discussion of the coordination between the public and private sector in the 
preparedness cycle. More specifically, this research helps develop a series of 
suggestions and recommendations to integrate the private sector successfully in 
all facets of the preparedness cycle to allow for seamless integration during 
disaster response and relief efforts. 
G. INTENDED CONSUMERS 
The intended consumers of this research are federal, state, and local 
policy developers, as well as private sector industry groups and consortiums, 
such as supply-chain managers and organizations, such as Business Executives 
for National Security (BENS).  
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II. PREPAREDNESS OVERVIEW AND POLICY REVIEW 
A. HISTORY OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
Disasters have been occurring since the dawn of time and will continue as 
long as the earth remains in existence. Although it could be argued that he had 
some inside information, Noah is perhaps one of the earliest and best examples 
of someone able to prepare for and survive a disaster. From the days of Noah 
building his ark, through Mt Vesuvius, the Black Plague, the Great Chicago Fire, 
9/11, and Hurricane Katrina, humankind has faced a myriad of disasters and has 
greatly expanded its ability to prevent and/or respond to such events. Before 
exploring what it takes to respond to a disaster, it is important to determine what 
actually makes a disaster a disaster. Dr. E. L. Quarantelli, who co-founded the 
Disaster Research Center in 1963, describes disasters as: 
Sudden on-set occasions that seriously disrupt the routines of 
collective units, cause the adoption of unplanned courses of action 
to adjust to the disruption, have unexpected life histories and pose 
danger to valued social objects. (Dynes, Quarantelli, & Rodriguez, 
2007, p. 11) 
Understanding a disaster in this manner helps everyone realize, although 
maybe obvious to some, it is the impact on collective units, perhaps better 
phrased as societal groups, that truly determines whether an event can be 
classified as a disaster. Under this definition, a Category 5 hurricane that never 
makes landfall, while a severe storm, will never be classified a disaster. 
However, a simple event, such as a cow tipping over a lantern in a barn, can lead 
to an entire city burning down, claiming 1,200 lives, and can rightfully be 
classified as a disaster (Nobleman, 2005, p. 43). Understanding the nature of the 
disaster itself is critical, such as understanding preventative measures against 
earthquakes. However, it should not be “the how” for which first responders are 
necessarily preparing. The true purpose of preparedness and response needs to  
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be centered on those impacted. It is the demands from society that dictate the 
levels of disaster preparedness. As this world, civilizations, and societies 
continue to evolve, so does the demand on response agencies. 
B. SOCIETAL EVOLUTION AND SOCIETY’S ROLE IN DISASTER 
PREPAREDNESS 
While firmly established dates as to when societies and civilizations 
started to take shape exist, many can be traced back to approximately 11,000 
B.C. when groups started to settle in one place to domesticate animals and 
engage in food production (i.e., farming) (Diamond, 1997, p. 93). Since this time, 
societies and civilizations have become increasingly complex and ever more 
reliant on government services. As societies became more stable, they began to 
provide excess capacity for food, and became dependent on staying in one 
location to maintain their stockpiles. This stability, in turn, led to the emergence of 
the political elite who dictated the distribution of excess food production (i.e., 
taxation) to those who would provide services other than farming (e.g., 
craftsmen, builders, scribes, etc.) for the rest of the society (Diamond, 1997, pp. 
90, 285). 
While some societies have continued to evolve from simple farming 
communities into large industrial complexes, other societies have continued to 
exist largely unchanged in technological advances yet have increased 
significantly in population. For instance, the tsunami demonstrated the 
vulnerability, impoverished nations have in the face of disasters, 
industrialized/modern societies are equally as vulnerable due to the increased 
complexity of the society, as noted by the effect Hurricane Katrina had on New 
Orleans.  
Researchers in the field of sociological responses to disasters offer 
perspectives that may enable response agencies to predict some behaviors that 
allow for improved responses, as well as a perspective on societal evolution 
regarding disasters. For instance, the Ottoman Empire did not mandate fire 
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prevention measures as late as 1826, “since calamities were considered an 
expression of the will of God” (Dynes, Quarantelli, & Rodriguez, 2007, p. 19). 
Even in this current day and age, some still share a similar sentiment regarding 
divine intervention and disasters. 
The Rev. Jerry Falwell and the Rev. Pat Robertson were roundly 
criticized for suggesting that the Sept. 11 attacks were divine 
retribution for abortion, homosexuality, feminism and the 
proliferation of liberal groups. (Cooperman, 2005) 
It is almost certain that this is a wind of torment and evil that Allah 
has sent to this American empire, a Kuwaiti official, Muhammad 
Yousef Mlaifi, wrote Wednesday in the Arabic daily Al-Siyassa 
under the headline "The Terrorist Katrina is One of the Soldiers of 
Allah . . . (Cooperman, 2005) 
These opinions clearly demonstrate some of the varying behavior patterns 
that can be expected during disaster responses. Moreover, demographic 
changes have altered what first responders encounter during disasters, some 
planned for, many unplanned for. For instance, in this country, dramatic 
increases have been seen in elderly households, single-parent families, and 
disabled persons across communities in the United States (Dynes, Quarantelli, & 
Rodriguez, 2007, p. 186). In addition, socio-economic factors significantly impact 
an individual’s ability to persevere during a disaster especially as it applies to 
providing their own evacuation logistics. Another example of societal 
expectations impacting response operations occurred during Hurricane Katrina 
when people began demanding to be rescued along with their pets. This new and 
unplanned demand on responders drained resources and hampered the 
response. These evolutions in society and subsequent expectations on first 
responders during disasters compel agencies to evaluate and evolve plans, 
doctrine and tactics constantly, and to integrate further all facets of society in the 
disaster preparedness system. 
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C. THE SCIENCE OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 
The nation’s disaster response system is a multi-layered and complex 
network of public, private, tribal, and non-governmental organizations that 
contribute in one form or another to responding to incidents. The NRF is the 
guiding document that establishes national level policy and procedures and 
outlines how all layers of this system are supposed to work together. 
This NRF is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards 
response. It is built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable 
coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across 
the Nation, linking all levels of government, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the private sector. It is intended to capture 
specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that 
range from the serious but purely local, to large-scale terrorist 
attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2008a, p. 2) 
Like most other policy documents, the NRF came into being after a series 
of disasters highlighted shortfalls to the existing disaster preparedness 
capabilities of this nation; most notably, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita during 2005. 
For instance, the Bush Administration’s first National Strategy for Homeland 
Security listed the following three strategic priorities. 
Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States 
Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism 
Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur (Department 
of Homeland Security, 2003, p. vii) 
It is clear the administration’s post 9-11 focus was on terrorist activity and 
did not mention other incidents with regard to their impact on homeland security. 
However, just a few years later, the Bush Administration’s second National 
Strategy for Homeland Security changed dramatically as noted by the President’s 
introduction to the document. 
Just as our vision of homeland security has evolved as we have 
made progress in the War on Terror, we also have learned from the 
tragedy of Hurricane Katrina. We witnessed countless acts of 
courage and kindness in the aftermath of that storm, but I, like most 
Americans, was not satisfied with the Federal response. We have 
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applied the lessons of Katrina to this Strategy to make sure that 
America is safer, stronger, and better prepared. (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2007, Preface) 
Just as it was observed how societies evolve, it is absolutely critical that 
this country’s disaster preparedness capabilities evolve. The complexities of the 
threats and society challenge agencies during local, regional, and national level 
incidents. With that, it is absolutely critical that all layers of the homeland security 
network follow a repeatable and common preparedness process. The disaster 
preparedness cycle as outlined in the NRF in one such methodology that enables 
a system to learn and evolve as the threats and society evolve (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Disaster Preparedness Cycle (From Department of Homeland Security, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, n.d.b.)   
The question remains of whether the NRF or any other guiding documents 
adequately prepare this country to manage catastrophic incidents or worst-case 
scenarios. The recent track record of responding to regional and national level 
catastrophic incidents, or worst-case scenarios, indicate this nation has a long 
way to go to respond successfully to these types of incidents. The NRF has a 
separate annex that defines a catastrophic incident as follows. 
A catastrophic incident, as defined by the NRF, is any natural or 
manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary 
levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting 
the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national 
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morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic incident could 
result in sustained nationwide impacts over a prolonged period of 
time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to 
State, tribal, local, and private-sector authorities in the impacted 
area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and 
emergency services to such an extent that national security could 
be threatened. These factors drive the urgency for coordinated 
national planning to ensure accelerated Federal and/or national 
assistance. (Department of Homeland Security, 2008c, p. CAT-1) 
While the NRF describes what agencies should do and how they interact, 
agencies have fallen short of effectively managing catastrophic or worst-case 
scenarios. 
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III. HURRICANE KATRINA CASE STUDY 
A. BACKGROUND 
Hurricane Katrina has been described as the most devastating natural 
disaster in U.S. history (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3.  Impacts of Natural Disasters in the United States (From Townsend, 2006) 
As Figure 3 clearly indicates, Hurricane Katrina brought about the largest 
cost in terms of property, which is explored in more detail as follows. However, in 
terms of impact on lives lost, Hurricane Katrina ranks behind other events, such 
as the Galveston hurricane of 1900 and the San Francisco earthquake.  
 
Regardless of the metric used to describe the impact, Hurricane Katrina glaringly 
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demonstrated some of the shortfalls and/or failures in the U.S. national 
preparedness system. 
Even before Hurricane Katrina became a named storm and before the 
warm air from the Sahara met the cooler waters of the Atlantic Ocean, residents 
of New Orleans and Louisiana knew  a chance always existed of major 
devastation to the city due to its construction below sea level. New Orleans was 
founded in 1718 and has always faced the threat of flooding as it sits in the “tidal 
lowlands” of Lake Pontchartrain to the north and is bordered by the Mississippi 
River to the south (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006b). 
Based on the history of flooding within the city and the geographic 
challenges, the Army Corps of Engineers was charged to develop hurricane 
protection barriers around New Orleans through the passage of the Lake 
Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood 
Control Act of 1965 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006b). 
Under the act, the Army Corps of Engineers was supposed to design and 
construct a network of levees and flood control machinery throughout and around 
the city of New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain. Under the act, the Army Corps 
was supposed to fund 70% of the project while state and local funds would 
account for the remaining 30% (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006b). 
Additionally, the Army Corps was directed to build the system to withstand a 
“fast-moving Category 3 hurricane and a surge of 9.3 feet to 13.5 feet on a 200–
300 year cycle with an initial budget of $85 million and a completion date of 1978 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006b). 
Throughout the history of the project, numerous design changes occurred 
due to environmental concerns, as well as engineering inputs. At the time 
Hurricane Katrina hit, the project was estimated to be about 60%–90% complete 
with an expected completion date of 2015 and a revised budget of over $700 
million” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006b).  
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B. SETTING THE STAGE 
Every year, the National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
releases the outlook for the upcoming hurricane season. NOAA issued the 2005 
assessment on May 16, 2005 and predicted an above-average hurricane season 
with a 75% chance of seven to nine hurricanes and three to five of those 
becoming a Category 3 or higher. In addition, NOAA updated this projection on 
August 2, 2004 to a 95%–100% chance of an above normal hurricane season 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory, Hurricane 
Research Division, 2006). In fact, along with the revised prediction, the National 
Hurricane Center (NHC) director also issued the following statement. 
Knowing precisely where a hurricane will strike and at what 
intensity cannot be determined even a few days in advance. 
…residents and government agencies of coastal and near-coastal 
regions should embrace hurricane preparedness efforts and should 
be ready well before a tropical storm or hurricane watch is posted. 
(Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, 2005b)  
Not only was the upcoming hurricane season predicted to be higher than 
average, the federal government sponsored a hurricane exercise in New Orleans 
over the course of the year prior to Hurricane Katrina intended to prepare 
agencies for a worst-case scenario of a Category 5 hurricane making a direct 
impact. In fact, the simulation projected 61,290 dead and 384,257 injured or sick 
in a catastrophic flood that would leave swaths of southeast Louisiana 
uninhabitable for more than a year (Associated Press, 2005). Despite the fact 
that this exercise occurred less than a year prior to Hurricane Katrina, and the 
residents, and state and local governments, were all well aware of the fact that 
New Orleans was under sea level and extremely vulnerable to any type of storm 
surge, a series of significant failures happened, which if prevented, could have 
saved many of the 1,300 lives lost in New Orleans.  
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C. STORM APPROACHING 
Starting on August 23, the National Weather Service (NWS) began 
tracking Tropical Depression Twelve, which would become Tropical Storm 
Katrina on the following day as the 11th named storm of the season (Knabb, 
Rhome, & Brown, 2005, p. 1). By August 25, the storm was gaining in strength as 
it was bearing down on the southeast coast of Florida and was upgraded to a 
Category 1 Hurricane. Further, the NHC was predicting that the storm would turn 
toward the Alabama/Florida panhandle once it entered the Gulf of Mexico 
(Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
2005a). 
The storm made landfall on August 25 at 6:30 pm across southern Florida 
with winds over 80 mph. As the storm moved across the southern part of the 
state, it resulted in 14 deaths, a million power outages, and over $1 billion in 
property damages (Rourke, 2005). Even as a Category 1 storm, Hurricane 
Katrina created significant damage and disruptions to the citizens of southern 
Florida. FEMA and other emergency service organizations were conducting relief 
efforts in the immediate wake of the storm itself after having pre-staged trucks of 
ice, water, and food in Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, Texas, and South Carolina 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2005b). Figure 4 depicts the amount of pre-
staged equipment in the southern United States available by August 29. In 
addition, FEMA, working with the local state agencies in Florida, began 
deployment of multiple emergency response teams and advanced elements, as 
well as coordinating video teleconferences between state and local officials. 
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Figure 4.  The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (From 
Townsend, 2006) 
A few examples are available of private sector assets being pre-staged in 
anticipation of damage to bridges and agriculture, such as pre-staged bridge 
repair barges by Norfolk Southern Railroad and offshore freighters loaded with 
agriculture by the Cargill Corporation (Townsend, 2006, p. 23). In addition, large 
companies, such as Walmart and Home Depot, activated their own emergency 
planning “war rooms” to cope with the pending storm, to prepare for business 
continuity planning, as well as working with vendors to stream supplies into the 
areas hit by the storm (Ward, 2005, p. 18). 
As the day progressed on August 26, Hurricane Katrina, downgraded to a 
Tropical Storm as it passed over Florida, quickly regained hurricane strength as it 
moved over the Gulf of Mexico. By that afternoon, the track for Hurricane Katrina 
was upgraded by the NHC and predicted forecasted landfall just east of New 
Orleans on August 29 as a Category 4 or 5 hurricane (Department of Commerce, 
August 26, 2005). More importantly, this same forecast predicted storm surges 
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15 to 20 feet above normal tidal range 56 hours prior to the hurricane making 
landfall. As a result of this forecast, Louisiana and Mississippi declared states of 
emergency and each of the Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) from 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were all activated at their highest levels 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2005b, p. 11). 
As the day turned into August 27, the track of Hurricane Katrina continued 
to solidify for a direct hit in vicinity of New Orleans and the storm continued to 
gain strength. As a result across the Gulf Coast, from Texas to Florida, federal, 
state, and local governments began to engage in emergency planning activities 
to include evacuation warnings, emergency sheltering, call-up of state National 
Guard resources and other related activities. FEMA was operating under Level 1 
operations, which was its highest level consisting of 24/7 staffing (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2005b, p. 11). Further demonstrating the concern concerning 
the potential damage the growing storm could create, the State of Louisiana 
made a request for an emergency declaration to the White House and the 
President approved the request. The last time a declaration was made in 
advance of actual landfall of a hurricane occurred in 1999 in anticipation of the 
arrival of Hurricane Floyd in North Carolina (Department of Homeland Security, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1999). As a further testament to the 
mood with regard to Katrina’s potential, NHC Director Mayfield directly called 
multiple state and local officials to underscore the storm’s strength and to inform 
them this could be the “big one” (U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, Hearing on Disaster Prevention and Prediction, 
2005). 
Even as the storm and warnings intensified, many local officials feared the 
worst about getting people out of harm’s way. In fact, State Representative 
Cedric Richmond personally relayed a story to Governor Blanco that he had 
attended a baseball game and that it appeared that many people either had not 
heard the warnings or at least were not paying attention to them (Louisiana 
Office of the Governor, 2005). However, it was not until 5:00pm on the evening of 
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27 August that the city of New Orleans began to issue voluntary evacuation 
orders’ this delay in beginning even just voluntary evacuations is somewhat 
mind-boggling when considering the planning factor for New Orleans was to 
account for at least 100,000 people who would not be able to evacuate due to 
having no means of transportation (City of New Orleans, Office of Emergency 
Preparedness, n.d.). Both Louisiana and Mississippi implemented evacuation 
protocols to enable “contra-flow” traffic on the highways leading away from 
coastal areas. Compounding the delay in the evacuation order is what Louisiana 
Governor Blanco described “hurricane roulette” in which citizens would simply 
ignore any evacuation order due to the complacency of having ridden out similar 
storms in the past (Louisiana Office of the Governor, 2005). 
Hurricane Katrina continued to develop in strength, but perhaps more 
surprisingly, it grew dramatically in size as well. It grew from a Category 4 to 
Category 5 storm, which solicited the following warnings from the National 
Weather Service and the NHC on August 28. 
The majority of industrial buildings will become non-functional . . . 
High-rise office and apartment buildings will sway dangerously——
a few to the point of total collapse. All windows will blow out. 
Airborne debris will be widespread——and may include heavy 
items such as household appliances and even light vehicles . . . 
Persons——pets——and livestock exposed to the winds will face 
certain death if struck. 114. The NHC issued advisories that warned 
the levees in New Orleans could be overtopped by Lake 
Pontchartrain and that significant destruction would likely be 
experienced far away from the hurricane’’s center. 115. The 
warning continued, [m]ost of the area will be uninhabitable for 
weeks . . . Perhaps longer . . . Power outages will last for weeks . . . 
Water shortages will make human suffering incredible by modern 
standards. (Townsend, 2006, p. 29) 
Based on the strength of these warnings and the personal phone calls 
leading up to the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, the serious nature of the potential 
of the storm was barely in doubt. Based on these new and stern warnings even 
more activity began in preparation for landfall which was nearly 12 hours away. 
For instance, citizens that were able started to move to shelters of last resort, 
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FEMA deployed state liaison officers, the U.S Coast Guard pre-deployed disaster 
response teams, and phone calls between federal and state/local agencies were 
occurring with regularity (Townsend, 2006, p. 29). On the morning of 28 August, 
Mayor Nagin along with Governor Blanco ordered mandatory evacuations of New 
Orleans (CNN Breaking News, 2005). As the day progressed, it became 
increasingly difficult for evacuations to occur or for supplies to be delivered to 
areas in need as tropical force winds began to impact the area, especially in the 
city of New Orleans.  
No evidence exists that any private sector support was formally requested 
prior to landfall at either the local, state, or federal level despite some companies 
having already pre-staged their own supplies and equipment in anticipation of the 
storm’s impacts. Originally only considered a shelter for those with special 
medical needs, the Superdome was declared a “shelter of last resort” at which 
eventually of 12,000 people showed up (Townsend, 2006, p. 29). As such, not 
enough food and water supplies were available to manage the large influx of 
people adequately that arrived at the Superdome, which led to the dire conditions 
during the aftermath of the storm; again, a perfect opportunity for the private 
sector to have assisted with this dilemma. In addition, “the Red Cross determined 
the Superdome did not meet their safety criteria and refused to put their staff in 
harm’s way, choosing rather to deliver necessary aid to the dome as soon as the 
storm had passed” (Townsend, 2006, p. 29). To compound matters, Mayor Nagin 
stated that the Superdome could actually support upwards of 70,000 people, well 
beyond the planning factors in the New Orleans hurricane plans (CNN Breaking 
News, 2005).  
D. KATRINA MAKES LANDFALL 
According to the NOAA, Hurricane Katrina made final landfall over the 
west coast of Mississippi after passing over the barrier islands of Louisiana as a 
Category 3 hurricane with sustained winds of 115 mph and gusts over 130 mph 
(Townsend, 2006, p. 33). In addition, the storm devastated the coastal regions 
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with a 27-foot storm surge that flooded coastal areas up to 12 miles inland 
(Townsend, 2006, p. 33). The devastation completely paralyzed any response 
efforts since most of the communications networks were washed away, as well 
as any pre-staged assets in the storm’s path. While the relatively flat coastal 
regions were essentially reduced to rubble, the city of New Orleans received 
most of the immediate attention during the aftermath due to the significant 
flooding of the city. In total, Katrina was responsible for over 1,800 deaths with 
more than 1,500 from New Orleans alone (Louisiana Department of Health and 
Hospitals, 2006). The amount of devastation was literally unparalleled, which 
caused a complete loss of power, water, and sewage services. In addition, the 
storm surge and flooding created an environmental disaster of unprecedented 
levels that caused major oil spills, the release of raw sewage, and incalculable 
amounts of contaminated debris. While the point of this thesis is not to detail the 
extent of the damage, it is critical to understanding the overwhelming challenges 
facing those in the response effort as it further underscores why it is absolutely 
critical to incorporate all available assets to a disaster of this magnitude. 
E. RESPONSE EFFORTS 
Despite the nearly overwhelming odds facing first responders, a 
tremendous amount of heroic efforts enabled over 1.1 million people to be 
evacuated and tens of thousands rescued from buildings, hospitals, overpasses, 
and rooftops, the Coast Guard alone rescued 33,000 people (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2005a, pp. 7, 47). Despite the many sacrifices and heroics 
by these selfless first responders, their efforts were significantly hindered due to 
the failed response system itself. This section examines several key areas of the 
response effort, and the areas in which the private sector did or could have 
improved the response. 
1. Emergency Sheltering 
As noted during the pre-landfall section, neither the New Orleans 
Convention Center nor the Superdome, were ever intended to house the number 
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of evacuees that ultimately arrived before and after the storm hit. In the 
immediate aftermath of the storm, almost 50,000 people occupied both locations 
when only several hundred were initially expected (Townsend, 2006, p. 39). Wal-
Mart had thousands of trucks ready to deliver critical supplies but was unable to 
work through the bureaucracy of the response and even had three tractor-trailers 
full of water turned around by FEMA representatives (Horowitz, 2008, p. 3). To 
the thousands of people trapped in the stifling heat of the convention center and 
Superdome, these supplies would have been instrumental in helping them cope 
with the dire situation. Wal-Mart employees even made critical decisions to help 
local hospitals by taking prescription medication from store inventories to shelters 
and hospitals that otherwise could not receive supplies (Kennedy School of 
Government, 2007). 
2. Command and Control/First Response Equipment 
As stressed by Ward (2005), both Home Depot and Wal-Mart established 
robust emergency operations centers able to establish reliable communications 
at the local level through satellite telephones. One of the strongest criticisms the 
federal, state, and local response efforts received was the lack of structured 
organization coupled with the complete inability to communicate across the 
response network (Townsend, 2006, p. 37). Similar to having water and food 
available for distribution, companies like Wal-Mart and Home Depot also 
provided supplies critical for the response effort. For instance, Home Depot had 
ultimately provided over 800 truckloads of equipment and supplies (Bond, 2005). 
3. Recovery/Community Resilience 
The hardest part of any response occurs after the “disaster-event” and 
involves the long-term recovery of the community. As has been discussed thus 
far, Hurricane Katrina presented itself as a “wicked problem” beyond the scope of 
anything seen in this country’s history. U.S. response systems simply are not 
constructed in a manner to deal with the long-term recovery of these types of 
problems. For instance, as of 2010, the population of New Orleans city stood at 
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354,850, only 78% of the population before Hurricane Katrina (Davis, 2010). 
According to Rachel Luft of the University of New Orleans, the vast majority of 
those who did not return to New Orleans were poor and African-American, and 
many do not have the means to return (Davis, 2010). 
Many at the federal and state level do not have the institutional capacity to 
provide resources for the long haul and further do not have the connection to the 
local community. In addition, the local governments typically do not have the 
resources to provide for long-term recovery and rely on charities and other non-
governmental organizations to help with this type of situation. 
Certainly, great examples of this kind of situation exist, as emphasized by 
Davis. Many charities have been building houses, such as Brad Pitt’s “Make It 
Right” foundation, that has built 50 homes, or the “Build Now” foundation that has 
built 38 homes (Davis, 2010), which are great examples of work in the 
community, but as suggested above, are only drops in the bucket compared to 
the 100,000 people that have yet return to their communities.  
Again, the private sector is suited to play a major role in this area. By 
definition, the private sector has a long-term commitment to the communities 
where they do business, as the community provides the critical revenues to stay 
in business as discussed in Chapter IV.B. This symbiotic relationship is already a 
motivator for private sector companies to become involved with community 
resilience projects but more can be done. For instance, FEMA partnered with 
Home Depot by staffing local stores with FEMA personnel to assist customers 
with options on fixing/rebuilding homes, and the American Red Cross would 
directly reimburse Home Depot based on pre-approved repairs to people’s 
homes (Kass, 2010). Paige Roberts, the Mississippi chapter of the Red Cross 
director of fund-raising and public affairs, stated the following regarding Home 
Depot, "Home Depot was very conscious of the sensitivity to time," she said. 
"The experience of recovery would be a lot more effective if all corporations 
jumped into the mission in the way Home Depot did" (Kass, 2010). 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The timeline of pre-landfall of Hurricane Katrina clearly suggests it is often 
possible to plan days in advance for a response effort that allows for the pre-
staging of equipment, evacuations, and deployment of personnel. Along the way, 
the case study demonstrates that the private sector was able to provide valuable 
assistance to people in need despite even being turned away by officials involved 
in the response. The fact that many private sector companies establish robust 
emergency operations centers, pre-deploy assets and surge personnel, is 
demonstrative of their commitment and capability in disaster preparedness. Their 
full capability was sub-optimized at a time when their resources were most 
needed. This situation offers no better case to support the hypothesis that the 
private sector needs to be fully integrated in the disaster preparedness cycle.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. WICKED PROBLEMS AND NETWORK ANALYSIS OF DISASTER 
PREPAREDNESS 
1. Wicked Problems 
As discussed in Chapter II.B., U.S. society has evolved into a complex 
network interconnected to the global community that results in a world in which 
large-scale disasters and cascading failures appear to be the norm. The term 
often associated with describing this environment is “wicked problems.” Horst 
Rittel and Melvin Webber (1973) developed what is thought to be the initial 
description of a wicked problem in 1973. They outlined 10 traits that 
characterized wicked problems as outlined below. 
1. No definitive formulation of a wicked problem exists (defining 
wicked problems is itself a wicked problem) 
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule 
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but better or 
worse 
4. No immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked 
problem is available  
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a "one-shot operation;" 
because no opportunity exists to learn by trial and error; every 
attempt counts significantly 
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively 
describable) set of potential solutions, nor is a well-described set of 
permissible operations available that may be incorporated into the 
plan 
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique 
8. Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another 
problem 
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can 
be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation 
determines the nature of the problem's resolution. 
10. The planner has no right to be wrong (planners are liable for the 
consequences of the actions they generate) (Ritchey, 2005) 
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Jeff Conklin further revised the definition and characteristics to take a 
broader view and give the concept of wicked problems a larger societal context. 
Conklin’s (2006) view is that not only does this nation continue to face problems 
that meet the criteria that Rittel and Webber outlined, but also faces an 
increasingly complex society that further compounds the wicked problem itself (p. 
11). Conklin defines social complexity as a result of the diverse nature of society 
and the competing demands within that society. As the diversity of U.S. society 
increases due to economics, globalization, etc., the desired outcomes as part of 
a wicked problem become so divergent that collaboration becomes difficult at 
best to manage. A review of network theory provides valuable insights and 
potential solutions to facing these wicked problems. 
2. Networked Society 
Part of what makes American society so complex is its interconnected 
nature. No better example is the Internet to demonstrate how everyone 
communicates, makes purchases, searches for information, and develops 
opinions based on non-traditional media. The Internet continues to evolve as a 
network just as society continues to evolve as a network. Facebook did not exist 
just seven years ago, yet according Facebook’s reporting, it has close to one 
billion active users on the social networking site (Facebook, n.d.). The geometric 
growth of the usage of this system is just one of many examples of how 
networks, social or otherwise, play such a big part in daily lives to include 
telecommunications systems, emergency response systems, the national power 
grid, among many others. 
Albert Laszlo Barabasi has written several books in which he examines 
how networking theory applies to daily lives, and how, by taking a networking 
theory approach, it is possible understand better some of this nation’s social 
complexities. 
In his book, LINKED, Barabasi gives a wonderful history of the 
development of network theory. He describes how Leonard Euler first simplified a 
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classic argument of the “Bridges of Konigsberg” into a simple relationship 
between nodes and links. The problem originally asked if a way existed to cross 
each of the seven bridges within the city without crossing any bridge more than 
once. As described by Barabasi (2003), Euler’s “elegant and simple” proof 
demonstrated that understanding the relationships of nodes and hubs helps 
define the world live in everyone lives (p. 11). He was able to prove, based on 
the number of links and nodes that no single path existed across each of the 
bridges without re-crossing one of the bridges. Once a new bridge was built, this 
changed the structure of the network and enabled the citizens of Konigsberg to 
walk a single path across each bridge successfully without repeating any 
crossing. To Barabasi (2003), this aspect is the most important part of networking 
theory, in that, once the rules and laws governing the network are understood, it 
is possible to make changes to achieve desired outcomes (p. 13). 
This concept is an essential element in terms of protecting critical 
infrastructure or planning a response network that relies on resilient 
communications. Since the time of Euler, numerous contributions have been 
made to the concept of network theory, which are as equally important to how 
U.S. society is perceived. For instance, Paul Erdos and Alfred Renyi examined 
how random networks are formed. According to their theory, over time, each 
node will have the approximate same number of links. This concept is important 
to bring forward since it only takes one link for a node to remain connected to a 
network, and given even a big enough network or nodes and links, each node will 
have more than one link to the network. In other words, it has built-in redundancy 
(Barabasi, 2003, p. 24). 
Stanley Milgram is another important contributor to network theory as he 
applied network theory to social interactions and devised what has become 
known as the “small world problem.” The purpose of Milgram’s study was to find 
the average path length between any two nodes in a social network (Travers & 
Milgram, 1969). The Milgram study demonstrated that U.S. social networks are 
made of relatively short path lengths, or small worlds, with each person 
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connected to another person through an average of six links (Travers & Milgram, 
1969). This concept was poplularized into the play “Six Degrees of Separation” 
by playwright John Guare (1990). 
Mark Granovetter explored the concept of social theory even further by 
explaining how networks exist through “weak ties.” Granovetter (1983) suggests 
that everyone exists in a world of clustered networks connected to each other 
through a series of weak links; otherwise, the clusters would form one larger 
network (p. 209). As explained by Barabasi (2003), this model begins to reflect 
more closely the real world social network in which relationships determine the 
level of connectedness vice the completely random model of Erdos and Renyi (p. 
44). The Granovetter model becomes even more important upon beginning to 
explore networks from a hub perspective, as some nodes become hubs with a 
large number of links and plays a significant role within a network, especially if 
something damaging happens to that node. 
Barabasi introduces his concept of the occurrence of hubs in networks by 
referring back to the economist Vilfredo Pareto. Intrigued by what seemed to be a 
high concentration of land owned by a relatively few in his homeland of Italy, 
Pareto conducted a series of experiments to determine if this situation was 
pervasive throughout nature. What he discovered became known as the “80/20” 
rule in which 20% of a population is responsible for 80% of the resources, 
whether it be 20% of the population owning 80% of the land in Italy or 20% of the 
peapods in a garden being responsible for 80% of the peas (Bunkley, 2008; 
Barabasi, 2003, p. 66). When the results of the experiments are graphed, they 
form what is known as a power law distribution that demonstrates small numbers 
of nodes have the largest number of links in a network, and conversely, most 
nodes have relatively few links (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.  Power Law Distribution (From Network Science, n.d.)  
Barabasi discovered a very similar scenario when he and Hawoong Jeong 
set out to map the connections on the web. Besides from finding hubs on 
networks following the power law distribution, Barabasi and Jeong also 
discovered several other important properties of the scale-free (non-random) 
networks. 
Older nodes or nodes with extra attachments tend to attract an even 
greater amount of attachments; what they call “preferential 
attachment” 
These hubs constitute an Achilles heel of the Internet in that if the correct 
number of hubs is taken down, it is possible to crash a network 
(Keiger, 2007, p. 53) 
David Cohen writes that the discovery by Barabasi is important as it 
highlights the real world issues of relying on hubs in this society. For instance, he 
likened the hubs on the web to hubs in the air traffic system, if one of the airports, 
such as Chicago, Dallas, Atlanta, or New York, becomes saturated or shutdown, 
it creates a ripple throughout the entire transportation system (Cohen, 2002, p. 
29). 
Is this a form of self-organized criticality (SOC)? Ted Lewis of the Naval 
Postgraduate School discusses this concept in his book Bak’s Sandpile. Per Bak 
conducted a series of experiments to explain cascading failures. He likened the 
concept to a sandpile that continuously has sand added to its top, until the point 
when a single grain of sand will lead to a cascading failure of the whole pile 
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(Lewis, 2011, p. 11). This SOC has been linked to many failures in society 
including the recent economic crash in which the failure of just a few banks, 
created the biggest economic decline since the great depression. The point  
Lewis and Cohen are making is that networks have a single or relatively few 
hubs, and a large number of links are at risk of being overwhelmed, and thus, 
susceptible to failure. 
Another example is that of a young Canadian teenager who all too easily 
demonstrated the precarious state of the Internet and the danger of the “hub-
focused” networks. Operating under the code name MafiaBoy, the teenager 
executed a denial of service (DoS) attack first at Yahoo!, then several other large 
Internet-based companies. The basis of a DoS attack is to saturate a hub with 
enough Internet traffic so that it is unable to respond to legitimate day-to-day 
business requests (Erikson, 2008, p. 251). MafiaBoy was able to shutdown 
Yahoo! by easily hacking into personal computers linked to the Internet across 
the county and programming a series of viruses that set a time-release for a 
larger volume of “email-bombs.” The email were sent across the Internet into 
Yahoo!’s network, which overwhelmed the network and caused it to fail by not 
allowing anyone to access the Yahoo! website (Majid, 2006, p. 30). MafiaBoy 
demonstrated that you did not have to attack the hub itself directly by trying to 
infiltrate its security, but that with enough “ghost” traffic, it was possible to prevent 
the network from responding to requests. The estimates of the damage caused 
by these attacks range as high as $1.7 billion in lost revenues (Majid, 2006, p. 
30). 
Lewis (2011) further discusses the nature of networks and their drive to 
efficiency, which in effect, creates the SOC. Society’s desire to look toward the 
bottom line of revenues versus expenditures or outputs versus tax dollars, has 
placed many networks at risk of cascading failures (p. 12). One way to reverse 
this phenomenon is to build redundancy, or better yet, resiliency, into the network 




Applying the theories of networks and SOC, it could be suggested that the 
central role of the federal government in large-scale disasters serves as a major 
hub connected to all the nodes in the response network. Hurricane Katrina 
showed that when this hub was overloaded, similar to the MafiaBoy virus, it 
became unable to respond effectively to the demands placed on it. Meanwhile, 
vital supplies from the private sector sat idly by as they had no access to the 
response network, and thus, no communications occurred between it and the 
federal response personnel. Redesigning the response network to allow the 
private sector to be situationally aware of the demand signals of the response 
(i.e., connecting the weak ties of the private and public sector networks) would 
provide the much needed capacity and capability in the response, but just as 
importantly, provide a layer of resiliency to the response network to avert the 
failures experienced during relief efforts, such as Hurricane Katrina.  
B. VALUE PROPOSITION FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN DISASTER 
PREPAREDNESS  
Most of the recent responses to natural disasters have been aided by the 
capacity of the private sector. The evidence presented in this thesis from the 
Hurricane Katrina case study suggests the full capacity of the private sector was 
underutilized. Conversely stated, individuals and society in general would have 
benefitted from an increased role from the private sector.  
What is unclear however, is whether or not a value proposition for the 
private sector exists to lend itself to having its full capacity employed during 
disaster response operations. Additionally, for this capacity to be utilized most 
efficiently, the private sector would have to participate in the entire preparedness 
cycle. This section examines whether or not real economic value exists for the 
private sector to participate further in disaster preparedness, from planning to 
execution. 
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1. Economics of Disaster 
The impact of disasters on economic vitality is readily available in 
numerous studies. It was estimated that the worldwide economic losses incurred 
during 2004 due to natural disasters was over $145 billion or over twice as much 
as in 2003 (Hochrainer, 2007, p. 31). Moreover, a number of studies suggest 
natural disasters are increasing in quantity and are having an increasing impact 
on the worldwide economies due to a number of factors including the location of 
the disaster, large population growth, low use of mitigation and preventative 
measures, and limited available resources to respond to events among others 
(Miller & Keipi, 2005, p. 3). As highlighted by the aforementioned 9/11 
Commission, the private sector accounts for approximately 85% of the critical 
infrastructure in the United States and accounts for approximately 80% of the 
gross domestic product (Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2007, p. 9).  
The private sector clearly is the engine that drives this nation’s economic 
vitality, and as such, it is critical that it maintains business continuity in the face of 
a disaster. Moreover, it is equally important to the private sector that communities 
affected by a disaster recover as quickly as possible to enable them to conduct 
normal day-to-day business once again, which drives the bottom line for most 
companies.  
2. Value Proposition 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the private sector can and does play a 
critical role in disaster relief operations. Further, it is being argued that the private 
sector should play and even larger role in direct support to response planning 
and operations, especially as the scope of a disaster increases in size to the 
point it overwhelms the public sector response capabilities. It can be argued that 
building upon or relying on the capacity of the private sector is redundant and a 
waste of valuable resources; however, network theory teaches that redundant 
nodes and hubs on a network provide the best method of protecting the network. 
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It is important to note that this thesis presents the concept of utilizing both the 
public sector and private sector capacity to work together during the entire 
preparedness cycle, thus causing what could be perceived as redundant 
capability. However, as the discussion in Chapter IV.A.2 demonstrated, 
redundancy is a method of avoiding SOC and strengthening the network of this 
country’s preparedness systems  
The question remains as to whether or not the private sector has an 
economic incentive to participate fully in disaster response operations. According 
to a wide range of sources, private sector organizations are responsible to 
perform at levels necessary to satisfy an array of stakeholders. Pittman defines 
stakeholders as “any group or individuals who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 2010, p. 46). It is 
important to note that stakeholders apply to more than just the company’s 
stockholders. According to Goodpaster (1991), stakeholders are entities that 
have economic value at risk in association with a particular organization (p. 54). 
Moore & Khagram (2004) from the Kennedy School of Government describe the 
function of the private sector to “create private (economic) value” (p. 2). Further, 
Moore and Khagram discuss the intrinsic relationship between private 
organizations and customers.  
Private sector companies rely on various revenue streams to conduct all 
aspects of their business. Revenues come in the form of access to capital 
markets, but more importantly, from the customers willing to pay money to 
access the goods and services they offer (Moore, 2004, p. 5). A company’s 
ability to access the capital markets is predominantly dependent on their potential 
to continue to collect revenues from customers, thus leaving customers as the 
critical component for success (Moore & Khagram, 2004, p. 5). These examples 
are just a few of the theories regarding the purpose and role of the private sector; 
however, most focus on the private sector’s fiduciary responsibility to create 
profit, value, and goods and services to its stockholders, or more broadly, its 
stakeholders.  
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Over the last several decades, American society and the international 
community for that matter have been examining these models and pushing the 
private sector to contribute more than just goods, services, and profits to 
stakeholders. Beyond just the boardroom, organizations have responsibilities 
ranging from ensuring customer satisfaction is maintained, as they are the driving 
engine of the company’s profits, to protecting the environment and assuring the 
surrounding communities are not adversely impacted due to their business 
activities.  
Robert Kaplan is one of the leaders in this field of study detailing the 
importance of a “balanced scorecard” as it relates to developing and measuring 
strategic goals that go beyond just measuring profits; such as customer 
satisfaction and the ability to innovate. Another emerging field of study being 
operationalized in the corporate world is the concept of corporate responsibility.  
One method of tracking this area was through the development of an 
accounting practice called the triple-bottom line of economic, social, and 
environmental accounting and reporting (Brown, Dillard, & Marshall, 2006, p. 5). 
The triple-bottom line was developed by John Elkington, the co-founder of 
SustainAbility, and was intended to provide a form of measurements to 
companies in which they could provide stakeholders a view of the companies 
commitment or value in environmental and sustainability activities, as well as 
traditional (i.e., sales revenues, profit, and loss) business activities (Cheney, 
2004).  
While some could argue this type of metric is merely window dressing to 
improve an organization’s public image, it is still an indication of corporate 
awareness to the importance of their standing and relevance in communities, 
from the local level to the international stage (Schilizzi, 2002). 
Moore and Khagram applied a strategic planning model they developed 
for the public sector to the private sector to demonstrate how corporations can 
benefit from generating public value or taking a “corporate responsibility” 
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perspective. The original intent of their model was to provide a strategic planning 
framework for managers in a public entity to highlight the interconnectedness of 
customer needs, politics, and the mission (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.  Public/Private Interconnectedness Model (From Moore, 1995, p. 23) 
“Judging the value of the imagined purpose of the entity 
Manage upward, toward politics, to invest their purpose with legitimacy 
and support 
Manage downward, toward improving the organizations capabilities for 
achieving the desired purposes” (Moore, 1995, p. 23)  
By default, the model demonstrates the inter-connectedness within the 
private sector between business operations, value, and legitimacy of its 
operations.  
The linkage in the model is that businesses need to do more than just 
drive revenues to help the bottom line. In effect, they exist to provide goods and 
services to customers, and as a result, have a responsibility to contribute to 
communities in a way that will ensure their customers continue to do business 
with them. 
In addition to stockholder/stakeholder perspectives of viewing private 
sector companies, it is also necessary to examine the market forces at play that 
create the working environment for the private sector, and in return, dictates 
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some of the behaviors of organizations. Michael Porter of the Harvard Business 
School developed a model to describe the forces affecting the private sector (see 
Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7.  Porter’s Five Forces (From Porter, 2008, Executive Summary) 
Porter describes his models as follows. 
If the forces are intense, as they are in such industries as airlines, 
textiles, and hotels, almost no company earns attractive returns on 
investment. If the forces are benign, as they are in industries such 
as software, soft drinks, and toiletries, many companies are 
profitable. Industry structure drives competition and profitability, not 
whether an industry produces a product or service, is emerging or 
mature, high tech or low tech, regulated or unregulated. While a 
myriad of factors can affect industry profitability in the short run—
including the weather and the business cycle—industry structure, 
manifested in the competitive forces, sets industry profitability in the 
medium and long run. (Porter, 2008) 
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If the discussion of Porter’s model is framed through the disaster response 
lens, several areas can seen in which businesses need to not only be aware of 
but perhaps heavily involved in working through the disaster response from a 
business continuity, as well as customer resiliency perspective. For instance, in 
the wake of a large natural disaster, a business will have to be attentive to a 
disruption of its supply chain and whether or not that leaves it vulnerable to 
having its customers moving to other competitors.  
Looking back at the earthquake in Japan, Toyota saw significant 
disruptions in both its production capability, as well as its supply chains, that may 
result in losses of $1.5 billion in profits and $5 billion in net income during the 2nd 
quarter of 2011 (Morrison, 2011). Not only is Toyota losing sales revenues and 
profits, it appears as though GM, Ford, and Chrysler have all benefitted from 
Toyota’s problems as they have all seen increase in sales. GM and Ford 
reported increased sales in the same quarter of 10% and Chrysler reported an 
increase of 30% while both Honda and Toyota reported decreases in excess of 
20% (Kirsher & Durbin, 2011). Even as the earthquake impacted the ability of 
Toyota to bring models to the market, higher gas prices drove the U.S. car buyer 
to seek small to mid-size fuel efficient models, which is what primarily drove the 
rise in sales for the U.S. car makers. 
The Japan earthquake is a very good example of how a disaster and the 
aftermath of a disaster can impact the bottom line of the private sector, which is 
not to suggest the private sector could have prevented the actual earthquake. 
Rather, it would appear it is imperative for the private sector to have a place in 
the response discussions as it applies to its own business continuity, particularly 
in marketplaces in which a heavy dependence on suppliers occurs and where 
customers have lots of choices in providers for those products and services, and 
furthermore, the success of companies, such as Toyota, provide revenues in the 
form of taxes back to the government, again underscoring their need to be 
responsive and resilient during a disaster.  
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Again, reviewing Porter’s model and the value proposition of the private 
sector’s involvement in disaster response activities, it is only necessary to look at 
the impact that disasters have on the ability of customers to be able to continue 
to expend their resources, which provide the revenues critical to the private 
sector. This topic was explored in Chapter III as the Hurricane Katrina case study 
demonstrated how the private sector could help their customers return to normal 
spending habits.  
3. Goodwill 
In addition to physically helping affected customers, perhaps the private 
section could consider another factor in the value. Does the private sector have 
the ability to gain corporate Goodwill from their actions in disaster relief 
operations? Goodwill is an asset included on a company’s balance sheet to 
account for items, such as brand name, customer relations, employee relations, 
patents, and other intellectual property (Wagner, 2009). 
Companies have realized that the benefit of participating in disaster 
response is not just a way of gaining Goodwill but is also a corporate 
responsibility. For instance, Horowitz stresses how the CEO of Home Depot 
describes the potential concerning addressing customer needs during a disaster: 
“If we can be there when a customer needs us most, we can win that customer 
for life” (Horowitz, 2008, p. 3). One of the issues that has plagued consumers in 
the wake of disasters is the perception of price gouging. Wal-Mart has 
established a policy whereby they freeze prices in a region during the disaster 
relief operations (Horowitz, 2008, p. 7). Another strategy that Wal-Mart employs 
is its focus on using local store managers and other employees to deal with the 
media and the public during response efforts. As Diermeier (2011) emphasizes, 
these local employees have more credibility in dealing with a situation versus a 
more senior management representative that comes from another location. 
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4. Conclusion 
As noted above, different methods calculate the value that the private 
sector can attain in the operations of its business. As it specifically relates to their 
operations during disaster relief, evidence and research exist to suggest that it 
may be in the economic best interest not only to continue but also to expand its 
role in disaster operations.  
Consumer purchases create the revenues that are the fundamental 
mechanism enabling businesses to continue their operations. Even though they 
have a fiduciary responsibility to stockholders, linking to consumer revenues 
should compel companies to consider all stakeholders (e.g., customers, 
communities, environment, etc.). Using Porter’s competitive strategy model, it is 
possible to see that a business faces both opportunity and threat when having to 
operate in an area impacted by a disaster. Further, companies are already 
implementing strategies to garner Goodwill in communities by providing aid and 
support to affected customers or potential customers. Therefore, it would seem 
critical for companies to continue to expend resources and expand their role in 
the disaster preparedness system. 
C. MEGACOMMUNITIES PERSPECTIVE OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 
Network theory and social complexity explain the interconnected nature in 
which everyone lives today. Yet, noted previously, the preparedness system only 
partially addresses the role of the private sector in the disaster response system. 
The 9/11 Commission clearly articulated the critical role the private sector plays 
in this nation’s economy, yet the policy for incorporating the private sector 
remains largely a voluntary process, which does not lend itself to rapid 
integration during a disaster. 
Mark Gerencser et al. authored the book, Megacommunities: How 
Leaders of Government, Business and Non-Profits Can Tackle Today’s Global 
Challenges Together, describing the need for the public and private sector to 
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form a collaborative partnership to combat the wicked problems this country is 
facing today. 
Walter Isaacson, President and CEO of the Aspen Institute, describes the 
concept in the foreword of the book as follows. 
These new complexities are a natural consequence of a world 
made smaller by greater integration and interdependency. Issues 
that arise in this environment can abruptly and unpredictably 
escalate, with a scale and magnitude that can quickly overwhelm 
the effected institutions. As a result leaders from all the sectors face 
a growing need to operate in a more open, distributed, and 
collaborative manner that recognizes the shared nature of risks, 
rewards, and responsibility. Unfortunately this type of activity is not 
intuitive for most leaders. (Gerencser et al., 2008, Foreword) 
As outlined previously, ample policy documents and research are 
available to support the concept of incorporating the theories set out in the 
Megacommunity concept; however, the practice of establishing a true 
collaborative and integrated network between the public and private sector has 
yet to be realized. The following analysis considers the concepts outlined in 
Megacommunities and applies it to finding solutions for enhancing the role of the 
private sector in disaster preparedness. 
The authors of Megacommunities developed the model to explain their 
concept visually; the blending of the government (public), business (private), and 
civil society (non-profit) (see Figure 8). This thesis is focusing solely on the 
relationship between the public and private sector, not to underscore the 
importance of the non-profit sector, but to focus the analysis on improving the 
integration of the private sector in disaster response. The non-profit sector, to 
include the Red Cross and other outstanding organizations, clearly has a place 
and can have an entire field of study regarding its role in preparedness.  
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Figure 8.  Megacommunity Model (From Gerencser et al., 2008, p. 56) 
According to the authors, the critical elements for a successful 
Megacommunity model are tri-sector engagement, overlap of vital interests, 
convergence, structure, and adaptability. 
Tri-sector Engagement: The fundamental underpinning of the model in 
that when each sector works together, it can leverage the 
capabilities and expertise of the others. For instance, the public 
sector has the authority to commit resources to a particular event, 
but as Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, but it lacks the expertise in 
managing large-scale disasters. Similarly, while the private sector 
can move large amounts of product, it may not have a full 
understanding of parts of the community most at risk. The citizens 
most often at risk are not able to participate fully in the marketplace, 
and thus, have the highest potential to go unnoticed (e.g., large 
number of evacuees encountered at the Superdome and 
Convention Center in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina). 
FEMA director Michael Brown made this exact observation in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, “we are seeing people we didn’t 
even know existed” (PBS Newshour, 2005). This comment 
underscores how critical collaborative integration of knowledge and 
expertise is to managing problems of this nature. 
Overlap of Vital Interests: The authors use this concept to highlight the 
fact that while not everyone in a megacommunity will have the 
same objectives, a common interest in a problem is shared, which 
is really an expansion of the “stakeholder” view of a corporation, in 
that a shared interest exists between management, employees, 
stockholders, customers, local communities, environmentalists, and 
government regulators. Each individual stakeholder has seemingly 
divergent interests, such as customers wanting the lowest price for 
goods and services while management needs to maximize 
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revenues to produce the desired return on investment for 
stockholders. While the objects are divergent, the interest is 
common and provides the shared forum for the stakeholders to 
discuss their objectives. 
Convergence: Megacommunities will only work if the shared interests of 
the stakeholders result in a full and equal collaboration among the 
group. It is the unity of effort, despite potentially divergent 
objectives, that make the community successful and requires a 
great deal of trust and a “commitment toward genuine mutual 
action” (Gerencser et al., 2008, p. 71). 
Cross-organizational Structure: Network theory, as described earlier, 
lends itself to better understanding the concept of the structure 
necessary to enable the collaboration needed for a 
megacommunity to thrive. The combination of three different worlds 
of work, each with its own focused networks, is akin to the “weak 
ties” or “small world” models that Granovetter and Barabasi 
examined. Applying the theories of networks and SOC, it could be 
suggested that the central role of the federal government in large-
scale disasters serves as a major hub connected to all the nodes in 
the response network. Hurricane Katrina showed that when this 
hub was overloaded, similar to the MafiaBoy virus, it became 
unable to respond effectively to the demands placed on it. 
Meanwhile, vital supplies from the private sector sat idly by as it 
had no access to the response network, and thus, communications 
between it and the federal response personnel were nonexistent. 
Redesigning the response network to allow the private and civil 
sectors to be situationally aware of the demand, signals the 
response (i.e., connecting the weak ties between these networks) 
would not only provide much needed capacity and capability in the 
response, but just as importantly, will provide a layer of resiliency to 
the response network to avert the failures experienced during relief 
efforts, such as Hurricane Katrina.  
Adaptability: Just as the problem facing the megacommunity, namely a 
wicked problem, will change and adapt to the environment over 
time, the community itself must be ready to adapt to meet the 
challenges it faces collectively. While the bureaucracy of a public-
private partnership model may initially provide the impetus for the 
weak ties of these networks to link together, it may ultimately stifle 
innovation by adherence to policy or memorandums of 
understanding. For a megacommunity to be most successful, the 
model must be nimble and agile to accommodate the changing face 




Katrina was focused on rescuing survivors, but over time, became 
focused on restoring communities and dealing with managing an 
unprecedented level of contaminated debris.  
1. Megacommunities and Worst-Case Scenarios 
Hurricane Katrina, 2004 Tsunami, 9/11, and the Oklahoma City Bombing 
are events that evoke a series of reactions and emotions to all Americans and 
many across the globe; whether manmade or a natural disaster, they each in 
their own way demonstrated this nation’s lack of foresight and inability to manage 
what could be considered worst-case scenarios. Despite their enormous impacts, 
it could be argued, with the exception of the 2004 Tsunami, they each resulted in 
a relatively low number of deaths considering the overall potential. For instance, 
on a typical day, over 50,000 people occupied the Twin Towers but luckily, “only” 
2,700 people were killed during the attack, still a staggering number, yet it could 
have been much worse. Of all these tragedies, the 2004 Tsunami had the 
greatest death toll, with estimates as high as 330,000 people spread across 14 
countries.  
This country’s disaster planners talk about planning for worst-case 
scenarios, but unfortunately, the full lessons learned are not integrated in U.S. 
preparedness goals. For instance, the federal government sponsored a 
Hurricane Exercise for New Orleans intended to produce a worst-case scenario 
of a Category 5 hurricane making a direct impact. In fact, the simulation predicted 
projected 61,290 dead and 384,257 injured or sick in a catastrophic flood that 
would leave swaths of southeast Louisiana uninhabitable for more than a year 
(Associated Press, 2005). What would happen if this country faced an even 
greater disaster, such as a successful nuclear attack by a terrorist group? 
The first component of risk, threat, “is a measure of the likelihood that a 
specific type of attack will be attempted against a specific target” (Jones & 
Edmonds, 2008). During an interview for Time Magazine in December 1998, Bin 
Laden was quoted as stating the following with regard to acquiring nuclear 
weapons, "Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I 
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have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. 
And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin 
for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels 
from inflicting harm on Muslims" (Yusufzai, 1999). It could be questioned whether 
or not Bin Laden is using the idea of gaining access to nuclear weapons as a 
method to distract counter-terrorism efforts from his real targets; however, that 
seems unlikely given his proven track record of successfully executing threats. 
According to then Undersecretary of State John Bolton, "I don't have any doubt 
that al Qaeda was pursuing nuclear, biological and chemical warfare capabilities. 
It's not our judgment at the moment that they were that far along, but I have no 
doubt that they were seeking to do so" (Boettcher & Arnesen, 2002). Regarding 
the question of threat, it is a logical conclusion to suggest the threat of a terrorist 
group, specifically Al Qaeda, attempting to use a nuclear device against the 
United States is all too real. In fact, on July 14, 2006, then DHS Secretary 
Michael Chertoff stated the following. 
The single biggest threat we worry about, in terms of protecting this 
country and securing the homeland, is the threat of a weapon of 
mass destruction. And at the very top of the scale is a nuclear 
device or a radiological device. (Department of Homeland Security, 
2006) 
Since any recent nuclear attacks have not occurred, the impacts of the 
nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are examined as a 
surrogate.  
The death toll for Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been assessed as high as 
340,000 when long-term impacts, such as cancer and radiation poisoning, are 
considered (U.S. Department of Energy, Office of History & Heritage Resources, 
n.d.). This number is even more staggering when considering the combined 
population of these two cities was approximately 600,000. The impacts to the city 
were just as devastating as nearly every structure within one mile of ground zero 
was destroyed, and less than 10% of the buildings in the city survived without 
any damage, with the blast wave shattering glass in suburbs 12 miles away (U.S. 
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Department of Energy, Office of History & Heritage Resources, n.d.). Again, 
assuming New York City, specifically Lower Manhattan, remains the primary 
target, the devastation for a successful detonation of a nuclear device would 
almost be incalculable. The estimated population of Manhattan is 1.6 million 
covering a 23 square mile area, the number of people on the island of Manhattan 
swells to 2.87 million when the commuting workforce is taken into account (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, n.d.). A successful nuclear 
detonation in the middle of Lower Manhattan could quite possibly result in 
several hundred thousand dead or severely wounded. In addition, assuming a 
similar level of architectural damage as experienced in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
it is likely the economic impact of the attack could reach $1 trillion in just a few 
weeks due to lost economic output and effect on the worldwide financial markets 
(Bunn, 2010). Without overstating the obvious, the consequences of a successful 
nuclear attack on Lower Manhattan would be second to none with regard to the 
primary impacts (lost lives, economic impacts, etc.) Moreover, the secondary 
impacts, terror instilled in all major cities across the globe, are virtually 
inestimable. 
2. Conclusion 
Hurricane Katrina demonstrated this nation’s inability to manage what 
ultimately resulted in a fraction of the impact that planners had predicted for a 
hurricane impacting New Orleans only several months prior to its landfall. This 
situation would be miniscule when comparing it to the utter devastation faced if Al 
Qaeda or other terrorist network successfully set off a nuclear device in Lower 
Manhattan. Further, Katrina highlighted the need for a megacommunity approach 
and looking at this problem through the lens of a worst-case scenario only further 
underscores the need to engage all available resources fully to respond to an 
event of this magnitude.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The analysis presented the basis for incorporating the private sector in 
disaster preparedness through a network-focused approach using the 
Megacommunity concept as a guide. The very foundation of the private sector is 
the symbiotic relationship between a company and consumers, and the 
relationship they have in the marketplace of goods and services being traded for 
revenue turned into profit (e.g., net positive value) for stockholders. From this 
perspective alone, the private sector has the innate responsibility to maintain an 
uninterrupted marketplace to keep the flow of goods, services, and revenues at 
full speed. Overtime, consumers have come to expect more from companies and 
companies have responded by adopting socially responsible practices and a 
penchant to build Goodwill within communities, greatly expanding the definitions 
of value, as well as expanding the beneficiaries of this newly defined value 
beyond traditional stockholders to a more broadly defined group of stakeholders. 
As noted above, different methods calculate the value that can be attained 
by the private sector in the operations of its business. As it specifically relates to 
their operations during disaster relief, evidence and research is available to 
suggest that it may be in the economic best interest to not only continue but to 
expand its role in disaster operations.  
Consumer purchases create the revenues that are the fundamental 
mechanism enabling businesses to continue their operations. Even though they 
have a fiduciary responsibility to stockholders, it is the linking to consumer 
revenues that should compel companies to consider all stakeholders (e.g., 
customers, communities, environment, etc.). Using Porter’s competitive strategy 
model, it it possible to see that a business faces both opportunity and threat 
when having to operate in an area impacted by a disaster. Further, companies 




providing aid and support to affected customers or potential customers. 
Therefore, it would seem critical for companies to continue to expend resources 
and expand their role in the disaster preparedness system. 
Just because it is in the economic best interest of the private sector to be 
further involved in disaster preparedness, is that enough to dictate a larger and 
more defined role alongside the government? 
During the analysis of the megacommunities concept, the response to 
Hurricane Katrina was used to demonstrate the current federal disaster system’s 
inability to manage the storms impacts even though the actual devastation was a 
fraction of the impact that planners had predicted during a planning exercise only 
a few short months prior to the actual landfall. Despite the overwhelming amount 
of resources applied in this disaster, neither enough resources nor effective 
coordination was available to keep up with the demands placed on the 
governmental response effort. In fact, it was largely the private sector that 
received the most praise for its ability to respond effectively to needs within the 
local community.  
Even though Hurricane Katrina could be classified as a “wicked problem,” 
its own set of impacts and challenges would be miniscule when comparing it to 
the utter devastation faced if Al Qaeda or other terrorist network successfully set 
off a nuclear device in Lower Manhattan. Further, Hurricane Katrina highlighted 
the need for a network-based megacommunity approach and looking at this 
problem through the lens of a worst-case scenario only further underscores the 
need to engage all available resources fully to respond to large-scale events of 
this magnitude.  
Applying the theories of networks and SOC, it could be suggested that the 
central role of the federal government in large-scale disasters serves as a major 
hub connected to all the nodes in the response network. Hurricane Katrina 
showed that when this hub was overloaded, similar to the MafiaBoy virus, it 
became unable to respond effectively to the demands placed on it. Meanwhile, 
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vital supplies from the private sector sat idly by as they had no access to the 
response network, and thus, no communications were available between it and 
the federal response personnel. Redesigning the response network to allow the 
private sector to be situationally aware of the demand signals of the response 
(i.e., connecting the weak ties of the private and public sector networks) would 
provide the much needed capacity and capability in the response, but just as 
importantly,  provide a layer of resiliency to the response network to avert the 
failures experienced during relief efforts, such as Hurricane Katrina. Combining 
this network approach along with the model put forth in megacommunities, the 
areas to improve national disaster response capabilities come into focus. 
According to the authors, the critical elements for a successful 
Megacommunity model are tri-sector engagement, overlap of vital interests, 
convergence, structure, and adaptability. These elements all have similarities in 
the world of networks.  
Tri-sector engagement explains the interaction between government, 
private sector, and society. In network terms, these areas could be seen as three 
separate but inter-related nodes or hubs with their own separate networks. The 
overlap of vital interests describes why these three separate communities need 
to rely on and interact with each other and where the network theory starts to 
take hold. Although separate networks, they each have many shared vital 
interests. For instance, the foundation of the U.S. government comes from the 
people, and in turn, the people rely on the government to provide order to 
society, broad services, etc. Similarly, the private sector relies on the payment for 
goods and services from society to return value to stakeholders, and society in 
turn, relies on the private sector to provide unfettered access to those goods and 
services. The relationship between the private sector and government is slightly 
different but transactional all the same. For instance, the role of government at 
times is to regulate industry to protect against a variety of abuses (e.g., labor, 
environmental, unfair competition, etc.) while at the same time, relies on a vital 
private sector to contribute taxes to run the government, as well as providing 
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services for which the government cannot, such as the private sector based 
military industrial complex.  
The next concept of megacommunities, that of structure, shows where 
networks are fundamentally essential to enable the collaboration necessary for a 
megacommunity to thrive. The combination of three different worlds of work, 
each with their own focused networks, is akin to the “weak ties” or “small world” 
models that Granovetter and Barabasi examined. Mark Granovetter explored the 
concept of social theory even further by explaining how networks exist through 
“weak ties.” Granovetter (1983) suggests that everyone exists in a world of 
clustered networks connected to each other through a series of weak links; 
otherwise, the clusters would form one larger network (p. 209). As explained by 
Barabasi (2003), this model begins to reflect more closely the real world social 
network in which relationships determine the level of connectedness vice the 
completely random model of Erdos and Renyi (p. 44). The Granovetter model 
becomes even more important upon beginning to explore networks from a hub 
perspective, as some nodes become hubs with a large number of links and plays 
a significant role within a network, especially if something damaging happens to 
that node. 
One of the underlying requirements for megacommunities to succeed is 
the notion of convergence, or that of shared interest. As demonstrated by the 
modern adaptation of expanded stakeholder groups, balancing the needs and 
interests of diverse groups can be difficult. Within the disaster response 
framework, the disaster itself and the collective desire to respond to impacted 
citizens, restore services, and in general, return to “normal” provides an initial 
convergent object. Typically, as time moves forward during large-scale disaster 
relief efforts, individual or group needs can diverge from the initial objectives of 
the response effort. For instance, as experienced during the Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill, the initial efforts focused on saving lives and securing the source of the 
oil leak. As time moved forward, groups began to use the incident to leverage 
their interests, such as reducing deepwater offshore drilling, improving inland 
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fisheries habitats, furthering economic development, etc. The integration of 
multiple nodes (i.e., weak links) into the response network enables some of these 
divergent issues to continue to be addressed while not overloading a single node 
within the network. 
The next element of the Megacommunity concept is that of cross-
organizational structure. Redesigning the response network to allow the private 
and civil sectors to be situationally aware of the demand signals of the response 
(i.e., connecting the weak ties between these networks) would not only provide 
much needed capacity and capability in the response, but just as importantly, it 
provide a layer of resiliency to the response network to avert the failures 
experienced during relief efforts, such as Hurricane Katrina, which showed that 
when the government hub was overloaded, similar to the MafiaBoy virus, it 
became unable to respond effectively to the demands placed on it. Meanwhile, 
vital supplies from the private sector sat idly by as it had no access to the 
response network, and thus, communications between it and the federal 
response personnel were unavailable.  
The final element to megacommunities is adaptability. Earlier in this 
thesis, the topic of SOC was introduced to explain the benefits of increasing 
nodes or hubs on a network to prevent the network from failing. The example of 
the MafiaBoy virus demonstrated the relative ease with which networks can be 
overloaded. Network theory teaches that with more nodes and hubs, the network 
becomes more resilient and adaptable. Again, linking the nodes of the Tri-Sector 
Engagement concept of government, societyand the private sector increases the 
resiliency and adaptability of the network. 
The research contained in this thesis presents the case that increasing 
evidence demonstrates that disasters, manmade, natural, or otherwise, are 
impacting society in an increasing manner in many ways including fatalities, cost 
to individuals, the private sector and the global economy. Further, as the scope 
of these disasters increase, and as their impacts increase, the ability to manage 
the response to these disasters has outstripped the traditional governmental 
 60 
centric disaster response philosophy. Using a network focused perspective, the 
analysis supports the Megacommunity concept by linking the governmental 
disaster response network with the private-sector’s disaster response capability 
and capacity to enable the overall response effort to deliver a more 




The literature and real-world experience thus far suggests that disasters 
are causing increasingly larger economic and social impacts throughout the 
globe, the federal government recognizes the importance of the private sector in 
disaster preparedness, and the private sector already is playing a role in disaster 
relief, albeit mostly self-generated. FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate aptly stated 
the following, "There's no way government can solve the challenges of a disaster 
with a government-centric approach. It takes the whole team. And the private 
sector provides the bulk of the services every day in the community" (Department 
of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, n.d.b.). 
However, policy to support a more clearly defined role for the private 
sector in the entire disaster preparedness cycle does not seem to exist. In fact, 
conversely, literature is readily available that supports the lack of coordination 
between all levels of government and the private sector. Retired Coast Guard 
Commander Stephen Flynn and Daniel Prieto (2006) directly support this point 
by suggesting, “the capabilities, assets, and goodwill of the private sector to 
bolster our homeland security remain largely untapped” (p. 1). It is absolutely 
imperative from a homeland and national security perspective that the private 
sector is given the necessary tools to participate actively in all aspects of the 
preparedness cycle. Some models of success are available to copy but many 
have limitations. For instance, INFRAGARD is a highly successful and national 
level organization led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that relies on 
the coordination of the public and private sector to protect portions of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure. However, it relies on voluntary enrollment by the private 
industry. Conversely, the Coast Guard has been given statutory authority to lead 
an interagency Maritime Security Committee (MSC), which incorporates both the 
public and private sectors. As part of this authority, the Coast Guard has created 
joint operation centers that formally incorporate the role of participants during all 
facets of the disaster preparedness cycle, but more importantly, provide a “seat 
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at the table” during response operations. This legislatively mandated model 
provides the foundation to expand this concept across all sectors. A model 
gaining in popularity at the state level and could be used to expand the MSC 
model is the Business Emergency Operations Center (BEOC) concept.  
The following recommendations use the Coast Guard MSC model as the 
foundation to create a similar statutory authority to expand the role of BEOCs 
throughout all levels of the disaster preparedness cycle to encompass local, 
state, regional, and federal levels of response. 
A. MARITIME SECURITY COMMITTEE  
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, which was the 
defining legislation for the Coast Guard after 9/11, created the requirement for 
Coast Guard Captains of the Port to establish maritime security committees. 
These committees were intended to assist the Coast Guard in developing a 
comprehensive maritime security plan for the port community to include both 
public and private entities (Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, 
(a)(2)). The MTSA gave the Coast Guard the regulatory authority over any entity 
operating in and around port facilities to include both vessel and facility 
operations. The maritime security committees have received high praise across 
all spectrums from the membership of the committees to the GAO. In fact, the 
GAO stated the following. 
Area maritime security committees have provided a structure to 
improve the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of 
information sharing between federal and nonfederal stakeholders. 
Stakeholders stated that among other things, the committees have 
been used as a forum for sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, 
providing information on illegal or suspicious activities and 
providing input on portwide security plans—called area maritime 
security plans—that describe the joint strategies of the Coast Guard 
and its partner agencies for protecting key infrastructure against 
terrorist activities. Nonfederal stakeholders, including state officials, 
local port authority operators, and representatives of private 
companies, said the information sharing had increased their 
awareness of security issues around the port and allowed them to 
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identify and address security issues at their facilities. Likewise, 
Coast Guard officials said the information they received from 
nonfederal participants had helped in mitigating and reducing risks. 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005) 
Information sharing between the public and private sector is often 
criticized whether it be in the course of normal business or during an actual 
emergency response. One of the aspects that makes the maritime security 
committees successful is that many of the members, both public and private 
individuals, have received security clearances to give them the necessary access 
to critical information that enables effective partnerships. 
For instance, although it is still in the trial phase, the Coast Guard has 
received legislative authority and the funding to support the creation of three 
interagency/public/private operations centers. These operation centers provide 
literal and figurative “seats at the table” for all the stakeholders within a port 
community, to include law enforcement, intelligence, industry, and community 
groups, to collaborate on developing deliberative planning documents, but also 
provide the venue to host all these groups during an actual emergency response. 
The GAO described these command centers in the following way: 
Interagency operational centers (Charleston, Norfolk, and San 
Diego), represents a step toward further improving information 
sharing, according to participants at all three centers. They said 
area maritime security committees have improved information 
sharing primarily through a planning process that identifies 
vulnerabilities and mitigation strategies, as well as through 
development of two-way communication mechanisms to share 
threat information on an as- needed basis. In contrast, interagency 
operational centers can provide continuous information about 
maritime activities and involve various agencies directly in 
operational decisions using this information. Radar, sensors, and 
cameras offer representations of vessels and facilities. Other data 
are available from intelligence sources, including data on vessels, 




As noted in this description, one of the critical elements that makes this 
committee successful is the ability for both public and private sector 
representatives to receive security clearances and have access to some 
intelligence information. Although the granting of clearances is sometimes slow 
and cumbersome, it is eventually effective in tightening the partnerships among 
the key stakeholders. Additionally, it is up to the discretion of the Captain of the 
Port, as the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator to decide which 
representatives are granted access to intelligence information. This feature of the 
committee is a key component to making it successful as members of the 
committee are operating on a level playing field across all levels, private or 
public. Naturally, information needs to be shared carefully, and only after 
thoughtful consideration, however, remains effective in establishing a 
collaborative spirit among the committee members. 
A somewhat unique feature within the federal government, not even the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan identifies granting of security clearances 
among the private sector. In fact, it only states that the private sector should 
provide recommendations and subject matter expertise (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2009, p. 2). Furthermore, the language used to describe the 
role of the private sector is that it is “encouraged” or may “voluntarily” participate. 
For instance, under the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, the private 
sector can voluntarily submit sensitive information pertaining to critical 
infrastructure; however, the sharing of information is handled very carefully due 
to privacy and proprietary concerns (Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. 
136). 
Finally, the other key element of the success of the maritime security 
committee is the openness this forum creates concerning the diverse parties that 
comprise the committees. While the membership is extensive, it is not limiting as 
the Captain of the Port has the authority to recommend other groups become 
part of the committee based on local or regional needs.  
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B. BUSINESS EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER 
The MSC, as noted by the GAO, is a laudable example of the benefits of 
formally linking and creating the structure to incorporate the resources and 
capabilities of the public and private sectors. The research contained in this 
thesis suggests few if any other examples mirror this concept to the extent that a 
legislative mandate exists to create it, and one that provides what many believe 
is the most critical element in any disaster relief operation, access to information, 
including the ability to credential and provide appropriate security clearances 
properly to ensure the membership has all the relevant information to make 
decisions. As mentioned above, INFRAGARD closely resembles the MSC but is 
a voluntary member based organization. Similarly, FEMA has created a National 
Business Emergency Operations Center (NBEOC), which is likewise voluntary 
and has no statutory authority to compel membership to participate in the full 
disaster preparedness cycle (DHS FEMA, National Business Emergency 
Operations Center). Moreover, the participants are only connected virtually (e.g., 
conference calls, etc.) and none of the privates sector participants have a real 
“seat at the table.” 
Conversely, many states have adopted a model in which private sector 
businesses are full participants in the EOC to include developing planning 
documents all the way to being actively present and involved in the physical EOC 
during a crisis. The organization called Business Executives for National Security 
(BENS) documented the emergence of the BEOCs through a survey of all the 
states. According to the survey results, varying levels of sophistication and 
structure to the BEOCs exist but their responsibilities encompass the following 
areas (Business Executive for National Security, 2011, p. 12). 
Assess and track the status of private sector problems and needs  
Assess the impact to the private sector of problems reported by other 
entities  
Gather information on private sector operations by phone, fax, email, 
Internet, news media, and other means available  
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Provide the EOC with information regarding private sector issues (key 
operational timelines, facility locations, building access needs, 
transportation issues, relocation logistics, security issues, recovery 
priorities)  
Make resource offers on behalf of the private sector to the EOC, as 
resources become available. Provide information for EOC status 
reports as requested  
Disseminate relevant information and guidance from the EOC to private 
sector contacts as authorized  
Provide brief verbal status updates as requested regarding current viability 
of the private sector and key infrastructure providers  
Provide a shift change report/briefing to the next private sector liaison on 
duty  
Participate in meetings and conference calls as needed during the shift  
It is interesting to note the BENS 2011 study further supports the thesis by 
noting that similar structures were not in place at either the regional or federal 
level. As highlighted earlier, FEMA has created the NBEOC, which is a step in 
the right direction; it does not have the same structure of participation as noted 
by the BENS study. A quick review of the Louisiana BEOC (LABEOC) provides a 
timely and constructive analysis of the benefits of formally incorporating the 
private sector into the disaster preparedness process. 
As a result of the lessons learned in the wake of Hurricanes Gustav and 
Ike, the state of Louisiana established a BEOC that established “links with over 
200 critical infrastructure facilities, assets and industry organizations from across 
the 18 critical infrastructure and key resources sectors identified by the 
Department of Homeland Security…providing a voice for over 180,000 business 
across the state” (Day et al., 2010, pp. 221–2). The LABEOC has a defined set of 
guidelines and objectives that encompass virtually all aspects critical during 
response to a disaster outlined as follows.  
Enhance pre-disaster preparedness and resilience 
Facilitate bi-directional public-private communication of critical information 
Estimate economic impacts of a disaster 
Expedite the resumption of normal business operations 
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Maximize the use of Louisiana businesses  
Assist in coordinating the flow of goods and services 
Coordinate volunteers and donations (Day et al., 2010, pp. 222–223) 
While the efforts and focus of the LABEOC are noteworthy, the ability of 
the entity to be successful is equally supported by the availability of a dedicated 
facility for members of the LABEOC to operate from, as well as a structure in 
place to support the flow of communications to and from the state EOC as noted 
in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  LABEOC Communications Flow (From Day et al., 2010, p. 226) 
As demonstrated in Figure 9, the LABEOC provides the connectivity with 
the private sector to be able to relay pertinent information back into the state 
EOC to assist in managing the response operations. Day et al. reviewed the 
efforts of the LABEOC and credited the organization with providing positive 
impacts in several areas in alignment with the goals established by the LABEOC, 
which are highlighted as follows. 
 
Economic Impact Assessments The LA BEOC team estimated the volume 
of the spill corresponding to various scenarios of spillage, as well 
as the impact to various sectors of the state economy by engaging 
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subject matter experts from universities, in consultation with 
industry. This work assisted in determining the impacts of the oil 
spill to the Louisiana economy.  
Proposal/Idea Collection In response to Governor Jindal’s call for 
innovative ideas, the LA BEOC team created a web portal that 
collected ideas and proposals, and forwarded them to the 
appropriate agency. The proposal categories included Coastal 
resource protection, dispersal and skimming, fish and wildlife; 
remediation and recovery, well shut-off effort, and boom. A science 
panel, consisting of experts from around the state, was established 
to review proposals, make recommendations, and forward to BP 
and the USCG.  
Private Sector Resources The LA BEOC team researched local, state, 
and national private sector resources available to meet specific 
needs identified by the Governor's Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) in managing and responding 
to the oil spill.  
Helpful Links The LA BEOC team published an informative website 
making relevant links available including those for volunteers and 
donations. as well as other emergency services available to the 
public (LAEOBC, 2010). 
The LAEBOC is a relevant example of the benefits of including the private 
sector in the disaster preparedness cycle including planning, training, execution, 
and evaluation. Moreover, the LAEBOC demonstrates the further need to 
formalize this concept to and including the federal/national level. 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
The focusing feature of MTSA 2002 was to require the Coast Guard 
Captain of the Port (COTP) to create area maritime security plans. Using this 
feature as an impetus, the Coast Guard used the COTP regulatory authority to 
require all port stakeholders (primarily private industry groups) to submit facility 
security plans based on standards set in the Security Act, as well as other 
regulations. The requirement for these plans was the initial impetus that enabled 
the committees to be successful as industry and the Coast Guard worked closely 
together to ensure each of the plans was properly submitted. As a result of the 
cooperation and information sharing, the committees continue to reap dividends 
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in planning and response situations. Additionally, the state-level BEOC initiative 
provides a proven and successful concept to incorporate the private sector 
similarly into the disaster preparedness process.  
National level policy should follow the same methodology of using 
legislative and regulatory authority to require industry to provide comprehensive 
disaster planning and response plans. Additionally, policy needs to establish the 
logistical and information-sharing infrastructure (i.e., BEOC’s) necessary to 
support as many private sector groups as possible in the national preparedness 
system. Finally, updated policy should provide necessary legislative authority to 
mandate private sector participation, as well as addressing legal issues 
surrounding liability concerns addressed in many states under Good Samaritan 
Laws.  
1. Structure 
Clearly, the private sector itself is a complex network of various industries 
and businesses and incorporating them into one BEOC type of structure would 
likely prove unwieldy if not completely dysfunctional. The National Response 
System already addresses the complexity of the governmental agency dilemma 
by defining the roles and responsibilities of government agencies under the 
Emergency Support Functions (ESF),  as outlined in the introduction to the ESF 
Annexes. 
The Incident Command System provides for the flexibility to assign 
ESF and other stakeholder resources according to their 
capabilities, taskings, and requirements to augment and support 
the other sections of the Joint Field Office (JFO)/Regional 
Response Coordination Center (RRCC) or National Response 
Coordination Center (NRCC) in order to respond to incidents in a 
more collaborative and cross-cutting manner. (Department of 
Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2008, Introduction) 
Table 1 provides the scope, roles and responsibilities in each of the ESFs. 
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Table 1.   Roles and Responsibilities of the ESFs (DHS, FEMA, NRF) 
(Continues on next page) 
 
ESF  Scope  
ESF #1—
Transportation  
Aviation/airspace management and control  
Transportation safety  
Restoration/recovery of transportation infrastructure  
Movement restrictions  
Damage and impact assessment  
ESF #2—
Communications  
Coordination with telecommunications and information technology industries  
Restoration and repair of telecommunications infrastructure  
Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber and information 
technology resources  
Oversight of communications within the Federal incident management and 




Infrastructure protection and emergency repair  
Infrastructure restoration  
Engineering services and construction management  
Emergency contracting support for life-saving and life-sustaining services  
ESF #4—Firefighting  Coordination of Federal firefighting activities  
Support to wildland, rural, and urban firefighting operations  
ESF #5—Emergency 
Management  
Coordination of incident management and response efforts  
Issuance of mission assignments  
Resource and human capital  
Incident action planning  
Financial management  




Human Services  
Mass care  
Emergency assistance  
Disaster housing  
Human services  
ESF #7—Logistics 
Management and 
Resource Support  
Comprehensive, national incident logistics planning, management, and 
sustainment capability  
Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting 
services, etc.)  
ESF #8—Public 
Health and Medical 
Services  
Public health  
Medical  
Mental health services  
Mass fatality management  
ESF #9—Search and 
Rescue  
Life-saving assistance  
Search and rescue operations  
ESF #10—Oil and 
Hazardous Materials 
Response  
Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) response  
Environmental short- and long-term cleanup  
ESF #11—
Agriculture and 
Natural Resources  
Nutrition assistance  
Animal and plant disease and pest response  
Food safety and security  
Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection and restoration  
Safety and well-being of household pets  
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ESF #12—Energy  Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration  
Energy industry utilities coordination  
Energy forecast  
ESF #13—Public 
Safety and Security  
Facility and resource security  
Security planning and technical resource assistance  
Public safety and security support  




Social and economic community impact assessment  
Long-term community recovery assistance to states, local governments, and the 
private sector  
Analysis and review of mitigation program implementation  
ESF #15—External 
Affairs  
Emergency public information and protective action guidance  
Media and community relations  
Congressional and international affairs  
Tribal and insular affairs  
Table 1. (Continued from previous page) 
 
Moreover, each ESF is assigned a primary federal agency responsible for 
executing the responsibilities within that ESF. Additionally, that primary agency 
already has the responsibility for coordinating with the private sector, as well as 
support agencies, state, and local organizations. Building off this authority, the 
NRF should be expanded to include formalizing the policy to include the private-
sector BEOCs organized by ESF at the regional and national level to support the 
state organizations. Similar to the state BEOCs, the regional BEOCs and the 
already FEMA established NBEOC would need a physical structure to enable 
representatives from the private sector to be in the room and have a seat at the 
table during all phases of the disaster preparedness cycle. To make it easier for 
the private sector to be fully involved, legal issues need to be considered. 
2. Legal Issues 
While the structure to support the inclusion of the private sector is critical 
to the process, just as critical is the legal, statutory, and regulatory authority to 
guide the process. As noted in the analysis of the MSC, GAO indicated that one 
of the most significant impediments to the inclusion of the private sector is the 
access to critical information, whether it be classified or otherwise deemed 
sensitive, and thus, requiring limited distribution. Moreover, it was documented in 
the BENS study that many firms are hesitant to participate more formally due to 
potential liability concerns (Business Executive for National Security, 2011, p.  
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21). Finally, the statutory authority given to the Coast Guard Captain of the Port 
to compel private sector participation in the MSC should be mirrored across the 
ESF structure for the BEOCs as noted above. 
While many states have what are commonly referred to as Good 
Samaritan Laws, no nationally recognized standard exists nor are any current 
provisions available within the NRF to support clarifying the role of the private 
sector, especially as it pertains to liability for their involvement. For instance, 
while first responders are typically protected by either their agency or state law, 
what would happen if a driver for a Home Depot truck accidentally crashed the 
vehicle being used and injured a bystander. Is the individual, in the reasonable 
execution of disaster response duties, liable? Or, is it the parent organization? 
Alternatively, should they be shielded from liability under the Good Samaritan 
code?  
As noted previously, the MTSA provided the statutory authority specific to 
the Coast Guard and its Captains of the Port. The Stafford Act affords the 
opportunity to provide the overarching statutory authority similarly. Therefore, the 
Stafford Act should be changed to provide the authority for the ESF primary 
agencies to create regional and national BEOCs. In addition, the Stafford Act 
needs to be changed to provide the legal protections similar to the state-level 
Good Samaritan Laws to insulate the private sector from certain liabilities in the 
execution of bona fide disaster response related duties. 
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